The Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow was a delta-winged interceptor aircraft, designed and built by Avro Aircraft Limited (Canada) in Malton, Ontario, Canada, as the culmination of a design study that began in 1953. Considered to be both an advanced technical and aerodynamic achievement for the Canadian aviation industry, the CF-105 held the promise of Mach 2 speeds at altitudes exceeding 50,000 ft (15,000 m), and was intended to serve as the Royal Canadian Air Force's primary interceptor in the 1960s and beyond.

Not long after the 1958 start of its flight test program, the development of the Arrow (including its Orenda Iroquois jet engines) was abruptly and controversially halted,  sparking a long and bitter political debate.

In the post-Second World War period, the Soviet Union began developing a fleet of long-range bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons to North America and Europe. To counter this threat, Western countries developed interceptor aircraft that could engage and destroy these bombers before they reached their targets.

A. V. Roe Canada Limited had been set up as a subsidiary of the Hawker Siddeley Group in 1945, initially handling repair and maintenance work for aircraft at Malton, Ontario Airport (today known as Pearson International Airport, Toronto's main airport). The next year the company began the design of Canada's first jet fighter for the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Avro CF-100 Canuck all-weather interceptor. The Canuck underwent a lengthy prototype period before entering service seven years later in 1953. It would nevertheless go on to become one of the most enduring aircraft of its class, serving until 1981 in a variety of roles.

Recognizing that the delays that impacted the development and deployment of the CF-100 could also impact its successor, and the fact that the Soviets were working on newer jet-powered bombers that would render the CF-100 ineffective, the RCAF began looking for a supersonic, missile-armed replacement for the Canuck even before it had entered service. In March 1952, the RCAF's Final Report of the All-Weather Interceptor Requirements Team was submitted to Avro Canada.

In June 1957, the governing Liberals lost the federal election, and a Progressive Conservative government under John Diefenbaker took power. Diefenbaker, from the Canadian west, had campaigned on a platform of reining in what the Conservatives claimed was "rampant Liberal spending". The debate was politically presented as an east versus west divide, with the Conservatives campaigning on a platform of eastern Canada using money from across the country to fund their "industrial welfare" projects. The Arrow was not the only major industrial project targeted during the campaign, others such as the "million dollar monster" postal sorting computer from Ferranti Canada were singled out for additional political scorn.

In August 1957, the Diefenbaker government signed the NORAD (North American Air Defense^[6]) Agreement with the United States, which required the subordination of the RCAF Air Defence Command to American command and control. The USAF was in the process of completely automating their air defense system with the SAGE project, and insisted that the RCAF had to use it as well. One aspect of the SAGE system was the BOMARC nuclear-tipped anti-aircraft missile, which when intercepting bombers over Ontario and Quebec would be exploding over major Canadian cities. This led to studies on basing BOMARCs in Canada in order to push the line further north, away from the cities.

Storms of Controversy revealed a top secret brief prepared for George Pearkes, then Minister of National Defence, for his July 1958 meeting with U.S. officials. The brief states,

"The introduction of SAGE in Canada will cost in the neighborhood of $107 million. Further improvements are required in the radar… NORAD has also recommended the introduction of the BOMARC missile… will be a further commitment of $164 million… All these commitments coming at this particular time… will tend to increase our defence budget by as much as 25 to 30%…"

Pearkes was also concerned about funding defence against ballistic missiles. The existence of Sputnik had also raised the spectre of attack from space, and, as the year progressed, word of a "missile gap" began spreading. An American brief of the meeting with Pearkes reported Pearkes "stated that the problem of developing a defence against missiles while at the same time completing and rounding out defence measures against manned bombers posed a serious problem for Canada from the point of view of expense…" In a document written after the cancellation, Pearkes noted, "We did not cancel the CF-105 because there was no bomber threat, but because there was a lesser threat and we got the Bomarc in lieu of more airplanes to look after this". It is also said Canada could afford the Arrow or Bomarc/SAGE, but not both.

By 11 August 1958, Pearkes requested cancellation of the Arrow, but the Cabinet Defence Committee refused. He tabled it again in September, and recommended installation of the Bomarc missile system. The latter was accepted but, again, the CDC refused to cancel the entire Arrow program. The CDC wanted to wait until a major review in 31 March 1959, to better examine world conditions. They did, however, cancel the Sparrow/Astra system in September 1958. Efforts to continue the program through cost-sharing with other countries were then explored.

Worldwide, the Arrow was not the only heavy high-speed interceptor design cancelled at that time; the Republic Aircraft XF-103 and the North American Aviation XF-108 Rapier, designed to have higher performance specifications than the Arrow, were cancelled in the mock-up stage of development at approximately the same time. Even the Convair F-106 Delta Dart was very nearly terminated. In the UK, the ramifications of the 1957 Defence White Paper led to the cancellation of almost all manned fighter aircraft development.

Canada tried to sell the Arrow aircraft to the U.S. and Britain, but had no takers. The aircraft industry in both countries was considered a national interest and the purchase of foreign designs was rare.

From 1955 onwards, the UK had shown considerable interest in the Arrow; in April 1956, the UK's Air Council^[13] recommended a purchase of 144 Arrows for the RAF to serve alongside the Saunders-Roe SR.177 mixed power interceptor, instead of the "thin-wing" Gloster Javelin then under study. The CF-105 would serve as a stopgap until the UK's F.155 project came to fruition. However with the F.155 due in 1963 and the Arrow not likely to reach the RAF before 1962, there was little point in proceeding, even if the costs of acquisition had not been so high. The infamous 1957 Defence White Paper, prompted by a general lack of funds, foretold an end to manned fighters and completely curtailed any likelihood of a purchase. In January 1959, the UK's final answer was no—with an offer to sell Canada the English Electric P.1 (the aircraft that would become the English Electric Lightning) instead. The French government was prepared to buy some 200 Iroquois engines, but cancelled their order in 1958, being advised by persons unknown that the Arrow was going to be cancelled.

The US Air Force had already developed three aircraft with performance intended to be broadly similar to the Arrow, originally as part of their "1954 Interceptor" project—the McDonnell F-101B Voodoo, Convair F-102 Delta Dagger and Convair F-102B (later Convair F-106 Delta Dart). Additionally, two more advanced interceptors (the Republic XF-103 and North American XF-108) were under development, although both would ultimately be cancelled in the early design and mock-up phases. Nevertheless it appears the USAF was concerned about the effect the cancellation would have on Canada's defence industry. In 1958, Avro Aircraft Limited President and General Manager Fred Smye elicited a promise from the USAF to "supply, free, the fire control system and missiles and if they would allow the free use of their flight test center at Muroc Lake in California (now known as Edwards AFB)".

The cancellation on 20 February 1959 known as "Black Friday" immediately put 14,528 Avro employees out of work as well as nearly 15,000 other employees in the Avro "supply chain" of outside suppliers.^[18][19] Declassified records show Avro management was caught unprepared by the suddenness of the announcement by the government. While executives were aware that the program was in jeopardy, they expected it to continue at least until the March review. It was widely believed that during this lead-up to the review, the first Arrow Mk 2, RL-206, would be prepared for an attempt at both world speed and altitude records.

An attempt was made to provide the completed Arrows to the National Research Council of Canada as high-speed test aircraft. The NRC refused, noting that without sufficient spare parts and maintenance, as well as qualified pilots, the NRC could make no use of them. A similar project initiated by the Royal Aircraft Establishment (Boscombe Down) had resulted in Avro Vice-President (Engineering) Jim Floyd, preparing a transatlantic ferry operation. This proposal, like others from the United States, was never realized.

Within two months of the project cancellation, all aircraft, engines, production tooling and technical data were ordered scrapped. Officially, the reason given for the destruction order from Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff was to destroy classified and "secret" materials utilized in the Arrow/Iroquois programs. The action has been attributed to Royal Canadian Mounted Police fears that a Soviet "mole" had infiltrated Avro, later confirmed to some degree in the Mitrokhin archives.

Along with the five flying test models and production aircraft, blueprints and other materials were destroyed, leading to the creation of a piece of Canadian mythology. The rushed destruction incited a number of conspiracy theories alleging American culpability for the Arrow's demise.

Rumors had circulated that Air Marshal W.A. Curtis, a World War I ace who headed Avro, had ignored Diefenbaker and spirited one of the planes away to be saved for posterity. These rumors were given life in a 1968 interview, when Curtis was asked point-blank if the rumor was true. He replied: "I don't want to answer that." He proceeded to question the wisdom of printing the story of a missing Arrow, and wondered whether it would be safe to reveal the existence of a surviving airframe only nine years later. "If it is in existence it may have to wait another 10 years. Politically it may cause a lot of trouble."

The fanciful legend endures that one of the prototypes remains intact somewhere.

Following the Canadian government's cancellation of the Avro Arrow project in 1959, CF-105 Chief Aerodynamicist Jim Chamberlin led a team of 25 engineers to NASA's Space Task Group to become lead engineers, program managers, and heads of engineering in NASA's manned space programs—Projects Mercury, Gemini and Apollo. This team would eventually grow to 32 Avro engineers and technicians, and become emblematic of what many Canadians viewed as a "brain drain" to the U.S.. Many other engineers, including Jim Floyd (whose design studies at Hawker Siddeley (Avro Aircraft's UK parent) on the HSA.1000 supersonic transport design studies were ultimately influential in the design of the Concorde) found work abroad in either the UK or the United States.

In 1961, the RCAF obtained 66 CF-101 Voodoo aircraft, one of the American designs the RCAF originally rejected, to serve in the role originally intended for the Avro Arrow. The controversy surrounding this acquisition, and Canada's acquiring nuclear weapons for the Voodoos and Bomarcs eventually contributed to the collapse of the Diefenbaker government in 1963.

Although nearly everything connected to the CF-105 and Orenda Iroquois programs was destroyed, the cockpit and nose gear of RL-206, the first Mk 2 Arrow, and two outer panels of RL-203's wings were saved and are on display at the Canada Aviation Museum in Ottawa, alongside an Iroquois engine.

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